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Abstract
In West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency (WV v. EPA) the Supreme
Court rejected an expansive reading of Section 7411 of the Clean Air Act.
Expressly invoking the “major questions doctrine” for the first time in a majority
opinion, the Court concluded Section 7411 of does not allow the EPA to require
generation shifting to reduce greenhouse emissions. This decision rested on the
longstanding and fundamental constitutional principle that agencies only have that
regulatory authority Congress delegated to them. The Court further bolstered the
argument that delegations of broad regulatory authority should not be lightly
presumed, but also left substantial questions about the major questions doctrine
unanswered. By skimping on statutory analysis and front-loading consideration of
whether a case presents a major question, the also Court failed to provide much
guidance for lower courts. While WV v. EPA represents a missed opportunity to
clarify and ground the major questions doctrine, it remains a tremendously
important decision, and will be cited routinely in legal challenges to new
regulatory initiatives. While limiting the scope of Section 7411, the decision did
not curtail the EPA’s traditional air pollution control authorities, nor does it
preclude the EPA from using such authorities to regulate GHGs. It does, however,
make it more challenging for the EPA or other agencies to develop new climate
change policies relying upon preexisting statutory authority directed at other
problems.
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WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA: SOME ANSWERS ABOUT MAJOR QUESTIONS
Jonathan H. Adler*

Forthcoming in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in West Virginia v. Environmental
Protection Agency (WV v. EPA) was a surprise. The Court rarely grants cases involving
challenges to regulations the executive branch no longer wishes to enforce. Once granted,
however, the outcome was not surprising at all. Twice before the Court had shown skepticism of
broad regulatory authority over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. There was no reason to think
this time would be different. The EPA would retain its authority to regulate GHGs, but it would
not be allowed to redesign the scope of its own regulatory authority for that purpose.
In WV v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for a 6-3 Court, rejecting claims
that the case was non-justiciable and concluding that the EPA lacks broad authority to limit GHG
emissions from power plants under the Clean Air Act.1 The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by

*
Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director, Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law; Senior Fellow, Property & Environment Research Center. I would like
to thank Kristin Hickman for comments on an earlier draft and Casey Lindstrom and Alexandra Mendez-Diaz for
their research assistance. Any errors or inanities are mine alone.
1

142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022).
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the Court's conservatives. Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito.
Justice Kagan dissented on behalf of herself and the other liberal justices.
Expressly invoking the “major questions doctrine” for the first time in a majority opinion,
the Chief Justice explained that Section 7411 of the CAA does not allow the EPA to require
generation shifting (i.e. the replacement of coal with natural gas or renewable energy) to reduce
GHG emissions.2 In so doing, the Court rejected the expansive view of EPA’s regulatory
authority favored by the Obama and Biden Administrations and endorsed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
WV v. EPA rested on the longstanding and fundamental constitutional principle that
agencies only have that regulatory authority Congress delegated to them. The Court further
bolstered the argument that delegations of broad regulatory authority should not be lightly
presumed. Extraordinary assertions of regulatory authority, such as the EPA’s claim that CAA
provisions authorizing emission controls on stationary sources could be used to decarbonize the
electricity grid, required a clear delegation from Congress.
The case’s outcome was foreshadowed in the Court’s decisions rejecting emergency
pandemic measures barring evictions and mandating vaccination or testing of employees in large
companies. These decisions, arising from the Court’s “shadow docket,” had signaled the Court’s
wariness of executive branch efforts to utilize long-extant statutory authority as the basis for
novel and far-reaching regulatory initiatives.3

2
3

Id. at 2610 (“this is a major questions case.”).

See Ala. Assn. of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S.Ct. 2485 (2021) (finding the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
lacked authority to impose an eviction moratorium to prevent the interstate spread of COVID-19); NFIB v. Dept. of
Labor, 142 S.CT. 661 (2022) (finding the Occupational Safety and Health Administration lacked the authority to
impose a universal vaccine-or-test requirement on all firms with more than 100 employees). For a discussion of
these cases, see [CITE SOMIN ARTICLE THIS VOLUME].
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While WV v. EPA reaffirmed that courts should be wary of allowing agencies to pour new
wine out of old bottles, it left substantial questions about the major questions doctrine
unanswered. By skimping on statutory analysis and front-loading consideration of whether a case
presents a major question, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court failed to provide much
guidance for lower courts. It may be clear that statutory ambiguity cannot justify broad assertions
of regulatory authority, but WV v. EPA provides little clarity on how the invigorated major
questions doctrine should inform statutory interpretation.
The Chief Justice’s failure to bring clarity to the major questions doctrine is particularly
disappointing given the seeds of a broader doctrine can be found in his own prior opinions,
including King v. Burwell4 and his Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission dissent.5 If
federal agencies are “creatures of Congress” with only that power Congress has delegated,6 it
would seem to follow that the burden should be upon the agency to demonstrate the power it
wishes to exercise has been delegated to it. And when confronted with broad, unprecedented and
unusual assertions of agency power, some degree of judicial skepticism would be warranted—
skepticism that can be overcome by a clear statement delegating the power at issue. Such a
holding would not satisfy those hoping for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, but it would
ensure that agencies only exercise those powers actually delegated to them.
While WV v. EPA represents a missed opportunity to clarify and ground the major

4

King. v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). I have been quite critical of the Chief Justice’s King opinion in these very
pages, but that criticism focused upon the Chief Justice’s statutory interpretation, not his understanding of the nature
of agency power. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective
Contextualism, 15 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 35 (2015). As will become clear in this essay, the Chief Justice’s statutory
interpretation in WV v. EPA was not exemplary either.
5

See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).

6

Id. at 371 (Roberts, C..J., dissenting).
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questions doctrine, it remains a tremendously important decision. It will be cited routinely in
legal challenges to new regulatory initiatives. It also hampers regulatory efforts to address
climate change, one of the most pressing policy concerns of the twenty-first century.7 The Court
barred the most expansive interpretations of EPA’s authority under Section 7411 of the CAA,
but did nothing to curtail the EPA’s traditional air pollution control authorities, nor does WV v.
EPA preclude the EPA from using such authorities to regulate GHGs. It does, however, make it
more challenging for the EPA or other agencies to develop new climate change policies relying
upon preexisting statutory authority directed at other problems. If there are to be additional tools
in the EPA’s climate-policy toolkit, Congress must provide them. The CAA was not written with
climate change in mind, and there is only so much the EPA can do to constrain GHG emissions
within existing statutory constraints. WV v. EPA put Congress in the policy driver’s seat.
Whether Congress has a direction in mind is yet to be determined.

From Massachusetts to West Virginia

Because WV v. EPA concerns the scope of the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG
emissions, it is worth placing the decision in the broader context of federal GHG regulation.
Controversy over the scope of the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions has simmered for
decades. Congress has never enacted legislation expressly granting EPA the authority to regulate

7

For my argument as to why libertarians should care about climate change, see Jonathan H. Adler, Taking Property
Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change, Social Phil & Pol’y, vol. 26, No. 2 (2009); see also Jonathan H.
Adler, Without Constraint, Times Lit. Supp. (November 13, 2015), https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/withoutconstraint/.
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GHGs as such.8 Rather, the EPA has relied upon various provisions of the CAA, enacted for the
purpose of controlling more traditional air pollutants, to control GHG emissions.
The CAA was enacted in 1970 primarily to control traditional air pollutants, such as lead,
soot, and smog. Congress amended the Act in 1990, providing explicit authority to control those
pollutants that cause stratospheric ozone depletion and acid rain. Somewhat conspicuously, no
equivalent authority was adopted to help mitigate global warming, and subsequent efforts to
enact such authority repeatedly failed.9 Thus, whether the EPA had the authority to regulate
carbon dioxide and other GHGs due to their greenhouse-forcing potential was unclear. 10
In 1999, several environmental organizations petitioned the EPA to regulate GHG
emissions from new motor vehicles under the CAA.11 The EPA’s General Counsel had
concluded the GHGs could be regulated as air pollutants under the Act. Based upon this
judgment, the groups argued the EPA was required to Act. The EPA initially ignored the
petition. After a change in administrations, however,r the EPA formally denied it, maintaining
that it lacked the authority to regulate GHGs and that regulation of such pollutants under the
CAA would not constitute an effective means to address the threat of climate change.12

8

Insofar as GHGs have other pollutant characteristics, Congress has enacted provisions that would enable EPA to
regulate those substances due to factors other than their potential to contribute to climate change.

9

See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2009) (“From 1999 to [2007], more than 200 bills were introduced in Congress to regulate
[greenhouse gases], but none were enacted.”); see also Daniel J. Weiss, Anatomy of a Senate Climate Bill Death,
Center for American Progress, Oct. 12, 2010, https://americanprogress.org/article/anatomy-of-a-senate-climate-billdeath/ (discussing failure of climate legislation in 2010).
10

See Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 15, 30 (2014)(“Climate
change is perhaps the quintessential example of a new environmental problem that the Clean Air Act did not
contemplate.”).

11

For the full history of the effort to compel the EPA to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA, see Richard
Lazarus, The Rule of Five: Making Climate History at the Supreme Court (2020). For a critique of this account, see
Lisa Heinzerling, The Rule of Five Guys, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 1137 (2021).

12

See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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A coalition of environmental groups and state governments sued, ultimately prevailing in
the Supreme Court. In Massachusetts v. EPA, a 5-4 Court concluded that GHGs were “air
pollutants” subject to regulation under the CAA, and that the EPA failed to offer an adequate
justification for failing to regulate such emissions from motor vehicles.13 While the Court did not
command the EPA to begin regulating GHGs, that was the practical effect of the Court’s
holding. Under the Act, the EPA is required to regulate motor vehicle emissions of any “air
pollutant” that, in the “judgment” of the Administrator “cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”14 As the EPA was
long on record acknowledging the threat posed by climate change, recognizing GHGs as
pollutants subject to regulation under the Act made their eventual regulation inevitable.15
The EPA made its first formal “endangerment” finding in December 2009, concluding
that GHG emissions from motor vehicles “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”16 The agency’s first regulations
governing GHG regulations from new motor vehicles followed soon thereafter.17 This, in turn,

13

549 U.S. 497 (2007). The Court also held, 5-4, that the petitioners had standing to challenge the EPA’s petition
denial.

14

See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).

15

Indeed, in rejecting the environmentalist petition that led to Mass v. EPA, the EPA accepted that the federal
government “must address” climate change. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,929–52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003).

16

See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for GHGs Under Section 202(a) of the CAA, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).

17

See Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
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set the stage for the regulation of GHG emissions from stationary sources, and the beginning of
the EPA’s troubles trying to control GHGs under the CAA.18
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA paid little attention to the difficulty of applying the
CAA’s provisions to GHGs. Had they done so, they may have discovered that the CAA “is not
especially well designed for controlling GHG pollution.”19 Yet the justices are far from CAA
experts and the question at hand – whether the EPA could regulate emissions from cars and
trucks – did not create much administrative difficulty.20 By contrast, meaningful regulation of
GHGs from stationary sources under the CAA would force the Agency “to engage in interpretive
jujitsu.”21
Under Section 165 of the Act, “major” stationary sources are required to adopt emission
controls for “each pollutant subject to regulation” when built or modified.22 Title V of the Act
further requires major sources to file permits demonstrating their regulatory compliance. Both
define "major” sources to be those with the potential to emit more than 100 or 250 tons per year
of pollutants, depending on the type of facility involved.23 For traditional air pollutants, such as

18

For a discussion of how the EPA’s initial endangerment finding under Section 202 of the CAA paved the way for
subsequent GHG regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 421 (2011).

19

Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2014).

20

One issue raised in Massachusetts was whether setting GHG emission standards for automobiles would conflict
with fuel economy regulations administered by the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration
(NHTSA), but the Court concluded the two agencies could coordinate their efforts to address any potential
problems. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (“The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the
two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.”).

21

See Freeman & Spence, supra note __, at 21.

22

See 42 U.S.C. § 7475. These provisions are commonly referred to as “PSD” for “Prevention of Significant
Deterioration.”

23

See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (defining emission thresholds for Section 165); 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) adopts the definition
provided in 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j), defining a “major” source as “any stationary facility or source of air pollutants
which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant.” For
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sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxides, these thresholds only reach the biggest and dirtiest facilities—a
total of several thousand facilities nationwide. Applied to GHGs, however, these same numerical
thresholds would require the regulation of millions of facilities, including many commercial and
residential buildings.24
Lest application of the CAA’s express terms to GHGs unleash a regulatory tsunami, the
EPA proposed to “tailor” the law’s application and enforcement so as to reduce the number of
regulated facilities.25 Specifically, the Agency decided it would redefine the definition of what
constitutes a major source so as to only reach facilities that emit over 75,000 tons per year. 26 The
EPA acknowledged the relevant statutory provisions were “clear on their face,”27 but defended
the new regulation as a “common sense” approach28 necessary to prevent the CAA’s permitting
programs from becoming “unrecognizable to the Congress that designed” them.29
However much the EPA thought this effort to “tailor” the Act’s requirements made
“common sense,” the Supreme Court concluded otherwise. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA (UARG), the Court rejected the EPA’s claim that it was required to treat GHGs as “air
pollutants” for all provisions of the CAA, particularly where doing so would “bring about an

regulation of hazardous air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) incorporates the even more stringent definition contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
24

See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,294, 55,
302 (Oct. 27, 2009); see also Freeman & Spence, supra note __, at 24 (noting the “burden would have overwhelmed
the agency and the states, frustrated small business, and led to accusations that the Obama Administration was overregulating”). For a fuller discussion of the impact of applying the statutory thresholds for major stationary sources to
GHGs, see Adler, Heat Expands, supra note __, at 432-35.
25

Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009).

26

Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010).

27

74 Fed. Reg. at 55,306.

28

Press Release, EPA, New EPA Rule Will Require Use of Best Technologies to Reduce GHGs from Large
Facilities/Small businesses and farms exempt (Sept. 30, 2009).

29

75 Fed. Reg. 31,562.
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enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear
congressional authorization.”30 Not only would the EPA’s interpretation greatly expand the
universe of regulated entities, the Court concluded, it would also necessitate granting the agency
the authority to rewrite clear statutory thresholds so as to ensure the Act’s regulatory structure
remained operational. In language foreshadowing the decision in WV v. EPA, the Court
explained: “When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to
regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement
with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”31 Here, Congress had indicated
neither that it wanted the EPA to regulate the millions of facilities that emit modest amounts of
greenhouse gases nor that EPA could revise numerical statutory thresholds.
While UARG was working its way through the Courts, the Agency was also beginning
work on regulations governing GHG emissions from new and existing power plants.32 This was a
priority for the Obama Administration because electricity generation is responsible for
approximately one quarter of annual greenhouse gas emissions.33
Under CAA Section 7411, the EPA is instructed to establish federal “standards of
performance” for categories of stationary sources that “cause[], or contribute[] significantly to,

30

573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).

31

Id. at 324 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.120, 159 (2000)).

32

This rulemaking was the result of a settlement agreement the EPA entered into in 2010 under which it committed
to proposing such regulations no later than July 2011 and final rules no later than May 2012. That timeline slipped.

33

In 2020, the electricity sector was responsible for 25 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. By comparison,
transportation was responsible for 27 percent. See EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2020, April 2022, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks.
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air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”34 The
“standard of performance” is defined as that standard “which reflects the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction,”
accounting for cost and other factors, that has been “adequately demonstrated.”35 Once such a
standard is set for new sources, the EPA promulgates guidelines identifying the standard of
performance for existing sources. 36 The EPA does not impose such standards on existing sources
directly, however. Rather, Section 7411(d) instructs the Agency to issue regulations providing
for states to submit plans imposing the appropriate standard of performance on existing
sources.37 Section 7411(d) also requires EPA to permit states to “take into consideration . . . the
remaining useful life of the existing source” when applying and enforcing the standard of
performance to a particular source.38

34

42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1).

35

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).

36

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). Under this provision, the EPA is not to set standards of performance for emissions from
existing sources that are regulated under the CAA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or
Hazardous Air Pollutant (HAP) provisions. Before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, some petitioners
argued that Section 7411 precludes the regulation of emissions from new sources if the sources are subject to
regulation under Section 112. As power plant emissions of mercury are regulated under Section 112, this would
have barred the adoption of any GHG standards for existing power plants under Section 7411. The D.C. Circuit
rejected this argument. See American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 985 F.23d 914, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court
did not accept certiorari on this question and the Court’s WV opinion appears to adopt the D.C. Circuit’s
interpretation of this provision. See WV,142 S.Ct. at 2601.
37
38

Id.

Id. 38 It is common in environmental law to set different standards for new and existing sources, reflecting both the
fact that it is often easier or less costly to install or include pollution control technologies when designing a facility
than to retrofit an old one, as well as the fact that owners and employees of existing sources tend to have more
political clout than owners and employees of new, not-yet-built sources. See See Jonathan R. Nash & Richard l.
Revesz, Grandfather and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1677, 1733 (2007) (“grandfathering may be appropriate in environmental regulation to the extent that
installing and upgrading pollution control equipment in existing plants may be both logistically difficult and
expensive”); E. Donald Elliot, A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at Fifty and A Suggestion for How
It Might Do Even Better, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 895, 915-916 (2020) (“Regulating future polluters more
stringently than those already operating often happens because it is less difficult politically to impose costs on
speculative future projects than on existing industries that are organized and have political clout…it seemed
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After years of development, the EPA finalized a set of regulations governing emissions
from new and existing power plants, the latter of which were called the Clean Power Plan
(CPP).39 Under the CPP, the EPA determined that the “best system of emission reduction”
(BSER) for existing coal fired power plants would not be based exclusively upon emission
reductions that could be achieved at individual plants, such as by the adoption of heat-rate
improvements that would result in more efficient fuel consumption. Rather, the EPA set the
BSER based upon consideration of the additional emission reductions that could be achieved by
shifting power generation from existing coal-fired power plants to lower-emitting facilities, such
as natural gas-fired plants, as well as “new low- or zero-carbon generating capacity,” such as
wind and solar.
The CPP anticipated that existing coal-fired power plants would reduce their emissions
by curtailing their own electricity generation, increasing reliance upon new natural gas, wind, or
solar facilities, or purchasing emission allowances from lower emitting sources. As described by
the Court in WV v. EPA, the BSER for existing coal-fired power plants was “one that would
reduce carbon pollution by moving production to cleaner sources,” not one that would reduce the
emissions from existing sources themselves.40 Indeed, the ultimate emission limit adopted in the
CPP was “so strict” that no existing coal plant could meet the standard without engaging in some
form of generation shifting.41 Under the CPP, states were required to submit their

intuitively obvious to the drafters that it would be less expensive to design pollution-control equipment for a new
plant than to retrofit an existing plant”).
39

See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units. 80
Fed. Reg. 64,661 (2015).

40

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2603..

41

Id. at 2604.
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implementation plans in 2018 for how the power sector would achieve the necessary emission
reductions by 2030.
Even supporters of the CPP recognized it rested on a “novel and far-reaching”
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.42 The CPP would never take effect, however.
States and coal companies immediately filed legal challenges against the CPP.43 In February
2016, a majority of the Court voted to stay the CPP, pending resolution of the legal challenges,
thereby preventing it from ever going into effect.44
The election of Donald Trump prompted a dramatic reversal in the EPA’s approach to
GHG regulation under the CAA. In March 2017, President Trump issued an executive order
instructing the EPA to review and consider rescinding the CPP and other EPA regulations
affecting the energy industry.45 Pursuant to this order, the EPA developed an alternative to the
CPP, known as the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule.46 This rule, promulgated in July 2019
was based upon a much narrower interpretation of the EPA’s regulatory authority under the
CAA—an interpretation the EPA now claimed was compelled by the plain text of the statute.
The EPA also argued that a narrow interpretation was necessary to avoid adopting a broad rule

42

See Freeman & Spence, supra note __, at 37.

43

Indeed, one such challenge was filed before the CPP regulations were finalized. See In re Murray Energy Corp.,
788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (proposed regulation of GHGs from coal-fired power plants was not a final agency
action subject to judicial review).

44

Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 1326 S.Ct. 999 (Mem) (Feb. 9, 2016); see also, Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme
Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Wash. Post., Feb. 9, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-theepas-clean-power-plan/.

45

See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar.
28, 2017).

46

See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8,
2019).
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that would trigger the major questions doctrine. Citing the UARG decision, the agency noted that
“the major question doctrine instructs that an agency may issue a major rule only if Congress has
clearly authorized the agency to do so.”47
Specifically, the EPA now concluded that standards of performance under Section 7411
could only be based upon emission control measures that could be adopted at each regulated
source—so-called “inside the fenceline” measures—and this could not include generation
shifting. Accordingly, the EPA concluded the CPP was unlawful, and the EPA could not impose
emission reductions on existing coal-fired power plants beyond that which could be achieved
through heat-rate improvements at individual plants. The narrow scope of the rule meant narrow
climate benefits. The emission reductions from the ACE rule were estimated to be as little as 1
percent by 2030.48 Just as red states and coal companies challenged the CPP, blue states and
environmental organizations immediately challenged the ACE rule, joined by some electric
utilities .
On January 19, 2021, the day before Joseph Biden was to be sworn in as the 46th
President of the United States, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
concluded that the repeal of the CPP and promulgation of the ACE rule were unlawful.49
Specifically, the court held that both the ACE rule and the repeal of the CPP were based upon “a
fundamental misconstruction” of the EPA’s statutory authority.50 Whereas the Trump EPA

47

Id. at 32,529.

48

See Congressional Research Service, EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy Rule: In Brief, CRS Report R465468, Oct.
15, 2020, at 7.

49

Although the three judges disagreed on the rationale, they were unanimous in rejecting the Trump regulation. See
American Lung Assn v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
50

ALA, 985 F.3d at 930 (“the central operative terms of the ACE Rule and the repeal of its predecessor rule, the
Clean Power Plan . . . hinged on a fundamental misconstruction of Section 7411(d) of the Clean Air Act.”).
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believed that standards of performance for existing sources had to be based upon measures that
could be adopted at each source, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Section 7411 “imposed no
limits on the types of measures the EPA may consider” beyond requiring the agency to consider
cost, non-air quality health and environmental impacts, and energy requirements.51 And because
the ACE rule rested “squarely” on an “erroneous” reading of the Act, it was vacated and
remanded to the agency.52
One month later, upon the Biden Administration’s request, the D.C. Circuit issued a
partial stay of the mandate in the case, so as to prevent imposition of the CPP.53 While the Biden
Administration preferred the Obama Administration’s interpretation of the CAA over that of the
Trump Administration, the CPP’s deadline for state plan submission had passed, and the relevant
emission reduction targets had been met or surpassed in much of the country. Despite the stay, a
coalition of states and coal companies filed petitions of certiorari. And somewhat surprisingly,
the Court granted certiorari.

Questions about Jurisdiction

From the moment the justices agreed to hear WV v. EPA, there were questions about
whether or not the case was properly before the Court. Article III jurisdiction only extends to
“cases or controversies.” Among other things, this means that those seeking to invoke a court’s
jurisdiction must have standing, and the case presents a live controversy that has not been

51

Id. at 946.

52

Id. at 995.

53

See WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2606 (noting stay).
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mooted by subsequent events. Given the EPA did not want to enforce the CPP or defend the
ACT rule, it was fair to ask whether there was Article III jurisdiction to hear the case.
Although it had not pressed this issue in its brief opposing certiorari,54 the Solicitor
General (SG) argued that the Court lacked Article III standing to hear the petitioners challenge to
the D.C Circuit’s decision.55 Specifically, the SG maintained that none of the petitioners could
demonstrate an actual or imminent injury from the D.C. Circuit decision to vacate the ACE rule
and CPP repeal, rendering any Supreme Court decision an “impermissible advisory opinion.”56
Accordingly, the SG argued, the Court should either dismiss the case for lack of standing or
merely vacate the D.C. Circuit’s decision and remand the case back to the EPA. The standing
argument was also picked up by the non-governmental organization and trade association
respondents, but not the other parties that intervened on behalf of the EPA.57
It became clear at oral argument that there was little support for the SG’s jurisdictional
arguments, and the dissenting justices did not meaningfully challenge the Chief Justice’s
conclusion that the Court had jurisdiction over the case. While some Justices suggested there
might be prudential reasons to avoid a decision, none pushed hard on the Article III claim—and
for good reason. While the decision to grant certiorari in WV v. EPA may have been unusually
aggressive, the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case.

54

Of note, neither “standing” nor “case or controversy” appears SG’s brief opposing certiorari. See Brief for the
Federal Respondents in Opposition, WV v. EPA, 142 S.Ct 2587 (2022)(Nos. 20-1530, et seq.). The brief did,
however, suggest that the petitioners’ claims would become moot, but only if the EPA adopted a new regulation
more akin to the ACE rule than to the CPP. Id. at 20.
55

See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 15-23, WV v. EPA, 142 S.Ct 2587 (2022)(Nos. 20-1530, et seq.).

56

Id. at 18.

57

See Brief of Non-Governmental Org. & Trade Ass’n Respondents at 23-32, WV v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022)
(Nos. 20-1530, et seq.).
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Standing is necessary both when a plaintiff first files a suit in federal court, as well as
when a party pursues an appeal.58 In the latter context, the standing inquiry focuses on whether
the petitioners experience an injury that is “fairly traceable to the judgment below,” and whether
a favorable ruling would provide redress for that injury.59 There was no question the petitioning
states met this standard. The D.C. Circuit’s judgment invalidated both “the ACE rule and its
embedded repeal of the Clean Power Plan.”60 Thus, as the Chief Justice explained, insofar as the
CPP injured the petitioning states, by obligating them to adopt regulations of the power sector,
there was “little question” they were injured by the lower court’s judgment.61 Tellingly, the
dissent did not contest this point.
While framing its argument in terms of standing, the SG also suggested that the D.C.
Circuit’s decision to stay the mandate until the EPA adopted new regulations under Section 7411
“mooted the prior dispute.”62 While intervening events may deprive a litigant of a sufficient
stake in the outcome of a lawsuit to deprive a court of jurisdiction, it takes more than a stay of a
lower court order to moot a case.63 Courts are reluctant to allow a party’s voluntary cessation of
challenged conduct render a case moot. As the Chief Justice explained, “voluntary cessation does
not moot a case unless it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not

58

See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693,705 (2013) (noting “Article III demands that an ‘actual controversy’
persist throughout all stages of litigation.”).
59

Food Marketing Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S.Ct. 2356, 2362 (2019).

60

ALA, 985 F.3d at 995 (emphasis added).

61

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2606.

62

See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 17.

63

At oral argument, Justice Alito asked the SG whether the Court had “ever held that the issuance of a stay can moot
a case.” The SG conceded she was “not aware of a precedent” to that effect. Transcript of Oral Argument at 86-87,
WV v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022) (Nos. 20-1530, et seq.).
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reasonably be expected to recur.”64 The government offered no assurance it would not rely upon
generation shifting or the D.C. Circuit’s broad conception of the EPA’s regulatory authority in a
future rule, nor could it. Thus neither the D.C. Circuit’s stay—which was not indefinite—nor the
potential of new regulatory standards, could moot the case. Again, the dissent did not argue the
point, even if only because the standard for mootness is “notoriously strict.”65
While conceding the Court could hear the case, Justice Kagan would not concede that
Court should have heard it. In a rush to “pronounce on the legality” of an “old rule,” Justice
Kagan complained, the Court issued “what is really an advisory opinion on the proper scope of
the new rule EPA is considering.”66 Whatever the merits of the legal arguments against the CPP,
she suggested, the EPA no longer sought to administer it, and was well at work on a replacement,
so the Court was effectively telling the EPA what it could or could not do in the future.
Justice Sotomayor pressed a similar point at oral argument, citing the Supreme Court’s
disposition of EPA v. Brown.67 That case presented a quite different question, however, which
may explain why it was not cited in Justice Kagan’s dissent. In Brown, the Court had accepted
certiorari at the government’s behest to review multiple lower court decisions striking down EPA
regulations that purported to commandeer state governments to implement particular air
pollution control measures.68 Although the government had sought certiorari, it then conceded
that the regulations could not be defended as written. Accordingly, the Court declined “the

64

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2607 (cleaned up).

65

Id. at 2628 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

66

Id.

67

Transcript of Oral Argument at 22 (citing EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 101 (1977).

68

For a brief discussion of this litigation, see Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act
Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism, and Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 Ecol.
L.Q. 671, 685-86 (2016).
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federal parties’ invitation to pass upon the EPA regulations” at issue, because “the ones before us
are admitted to be in need of certain essential modifications.”69 Because the EPA would be
revising its rules to cure their legal defects, any decision by the Court “would amount to
rendering an advisory opinion.”70 Accordingly, the Court vacated the lower court decisions and
remanded the regulations back to the EPA.71
Unlike in Brown, the EPA did not concede there was any legal problem with the CPP, or
the legal theory upon which it was based. The EPA sought to update and modernize its rules, not
reconsider whether it had the statutory authority to issue them in the first place. Nonetheless, the
government’s merits brief did suggest a similar disposition: Vacating the D.C. Circuit’s
judgment and remanding the case to the agency.72 Such a move would have redressed the
petitioning states’ injuries without requiring the Court to assess the scope of the EPA’s authority
in the absence of a rule to be enforced, and might have appealed to the Chief Justice’s minimalist
instincts. Curiously, this possibility was only raised in the SG’s merits brief, and had not been
suggested at the certiorari stage.

Choosing to Answer a Major Question

69

EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. at 103-4.

70

Id. at 104.

71

Of note, Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the litigation would not be moot unless and until the EPA
actually rescinded the regulations at issue, and because “an apparent admission that those regulations are invalid
unless modified is not a proper reason for vacating the Court of Appeals judgments which invalidated the
regulations.” Id. at 1-4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

72

See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 21.
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The Court’s decision to grant certiorari and schedule WV v. EPA for oral argument was
an ominous sign for the EPA. There was no reason to even consider hearing this case at this time
if a majority of the Court were inclined to rubber-stamp the D.C. Circuit’s broad construction of
the EPA’s regulatory authority. But the breadth of the issues presented—and the various
questions presented in the four cert petitions the Court accepted—gave the Court a wide range of
options.
At one end of the range of possibilities was a surgical, text-based holding, limiting BSER
to those measures that can be applied at or to a given stationary source subject to regulation. At
the other end was a broadside against broad delegations of regulatory authority, rejective even
the possibility that Congress could have so casually delegated power to the EPA to decide how to
remake the electricity sector. The most likely course, however was a middle course, echoing
UARG in relying upon the major questions doctrine and the notion that extraordinary assertions
of regulatory authority require extraordinarily clear congressional delegations. All four of the
cert petitions granted pointed in this direction, and the Court’s two COVID decisions indicated it
was primed to go in this direction.
Expectedly, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion spent little time focused on the intricacies of
statutory text and made scant mention of constitutional concerns about delegation. Instead, after
engaging in a bit of traditional interpretive throat-clearing about how to conduct statutory
interpretation in an “ordinary case,” the Chief noted there are “’extraordinary cases’ that call for
a different approach”73 WV v. EPA, the Chief then announced, was just such “a major questions
case.”74 The EPA was asserting the authority “to substantially restructure the American energy
73

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2608.

74

Id. at 2610.
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market” based upon an “ancillary” statutory provision that had never before been used for such a
purpose.75 Whether the EPA could define generation shifting as the BSER was not treated as a
routine question of statutory interpretation, in which a “plausible textual basis for the agency
action” would be sufficient.76 More would be required to justify uphold the EPA’s authority to
“restructure[e] the Nation’s overall mix of electricity generation” under the guise of setting
performance standards for stationary sources of air pollution.77
In deploying the major questions doctrine, the Court still faced a choice, whether to
invoke the doctrine as a canon of construction favoring more modest interpretations of agency
authority insofar as the scope of delegation is in doubt, or whether to use the doctrine to drive a
presumption against the agency’s claimed authority. These two potential approaches to major
questions were illustrated in the Court’s decisions rejecting emergency COVID-19 measures.
As a canon of construction, the doctrine would help resolve any lingering uncertainty or
statutory ambiguity left after a directly engaging with the relevant statutory text. This is how the
Court deployed the major questions doctrine in the eviction moratorium case.78 Only after
identifying reasons to reject the CDC’s claimed authority to forestall evictions did the Court note
that “if the text were ambiguous, the sheer scope of the CDC’s claimed authority . . . would
counsel against the Government’s interpretation.”79 The Court could not see textual or historical
support for the CDC’s claimed authority, and the major questions doctrine merely confirmed this
conclusion. Major questions was icing on the interpretive cake

75

Id.

76

Id. at 2609.

77

Id. at 2607.

78

Ala. Assn. of Realtors v. Dept. of Health & Human Svcs., 141 S.Ct. 2485 (2021).

79

Id. at 2489.
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The approach in Alabama Association of Realtors contrasts with that in the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration’s vaccinate-or-test mandate.80 In NFIB v. Department of Labor.
the Court announced that it expects a clear statement from Congress when “authorizing an
agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance,” and that the OSHA
mandate would qualify, before even beginning to analyze the relevant statutory text.81 Here a
concern for “major questions,” and a skepticism of the government’s authority, was baked into
the interpretive cake from the beginning. Rather than reject the OSHA policy based upon a close
reading of OSHA’s statutory authority, and the agency’s historical practice in applying that
authority, the Court deployed the major questions to drive the ultimate outcome.82
In WV, the Chief Justice adopted the latter approach. Despite the availability of textual
arguments that would have precluded the expansive construction of EPA authority that underlay
the CPP, the Chief Justice opted to deploy the major questions concern at the front end of his
analysis. This no doubt allowed for a shorter and less technical opinion, and avoided any need to
consider whether the EPA’s interpretation of Section 7411 could qualify for Chevron deference,
but it also left the Court majority vulnerable to the criticism that it had abandoned textualism in
favor of a result-oriented, purposivist analysis.
Under this approach, even if one might conclude that the EPA's preferred interpretation
of Section 7411 were a reasonable one, the nature of the power the EPA was asserting, and its

80

NFIB v. Dept. of Labor,142 S.Ct. 661 (2022).

81

Id. at 665.

82

For reasons why the OSHA standard was legally vulnerable even without resort to the major questions doctrine,
see Jonathan H. Adler, OSHA (Finally) Issues Emergency Standard Mandating Large Employers Require
Vaccination or Testing (Updated), The Volokh Conspiracy, Nov. 4, 2011,
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/11/04/osha-finally-issues-emergency-standard-mandating-large-employers-requirevaccination-or-testing/.
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lack of precedent, counseled a narrower construction. That the EPA’s interpretation of its
authority to define BSER might be plausible “as a matter of ‘definitional possibilities’” was
insufficient to justify the breadth of authority the EPA sought to assert.83 That the word
“system”—and the phrase “best system of emission reduction”—could be interpreted broadly
when “shorn of all context” was “not close to the sort of clear authorization required by our
precedents.”84 Such a cursory argument may have sufficed given this was a “major questions
case,” but it was hardly compelling statutory interpretation.
Justice Kagan did not pass up the opportunity to point out the weakness of the Court’s
statutory analysis, which relied more upon the history of EPA’s past practices and Congressional
inaction than it did a meaningful engagement with the text. She wrote a powerful dissent,
harping on the majority’s failure to provide a convincing explanation for why generation shifting
could not be a “system” of emission reduction.85 While her analysis is superficially powerful,
Justice Kagan did not grapple with the full statutory text either, nor did she delve much into the
CAA’s structure and operation. Instead she hammered away at the pliable nature of the word
“system” and the majority’s rush to embrace the major question doctrine. There were textual
counter-arguments to be made.86 The majority did not make them. Justice Gorsuch's concurrence

83

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2614.

84

Id..

85

Id. at 2641 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Some years ago, I remarked that "[w]e're all textualists now." . . . It seems I
was wrong. The current Court is textualist only when being so suits it.”).

86

See Nathan Richardson, Trading Unmoored: The Uncertain Legal Foundation for Emissions Trading under §111
of the Clean Air Act, 120 Penn St. L. Rev. 181 (2015)(identifying reasons why the EPA may not be able to require
or utilize emissions trading as the BSER); see also Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury
and the Bush Administration, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 10297, 10309 (2004) (arguing Section 7411 “clearly contemplates
individualized, performance-based standards for sources”).

DRAFT – Not for Citation
Adler – Major Answers

DRAFT – Not for Citation
Page 24

responded to the dissent to defend the provenance and utility of the major questions doctrine, but
it too failed to square off with Kagan on the statutory text.

What Makes a Question Major?

Once Chief Justice Roberts had declared WV v. EPA a major questions case, his task
became easier. No longer did he need to find that the EPA’s desired interpretation of the relevant
statutory provisions was out of bounds (with or without Chevron deference). Invoking the
doctrine enabled him to flip the presumption, and demand that those defending the D.C. Circuit’s
interpretation of the CAA find “clear congressional authorization” for that position.87 But what
made WV v. EPA a “major questions case”?
Chief Justice Roberts identified several factors indicative of “major questions” cases
under the Court’s precedents. These include that an agency is seeking to exercise broad
regulatory power over a substantial portion of the economy, that this power is “unheralded” or
had not been previously discovered or utilized, and that Congress has “conspicuously and
repeatedly declined to enact” express authorization for what the agency wants to do.88 If these
criteria sound somewhat fuzzy, that is because they are. Even before WV v. EPA, scholars had
complained that the doctrine did not produce an administrable line between which cases should
be considered major and which should not.89 Even though WV v. EPA was more obviously a

87

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2609.

88

Id. at 2610.

89

See Nathan D. Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions”
Doctrine, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 406 (2016)(noting “it is hard to determine what divides major questions from minor
or interstitial ones”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale.
L.J. 2580, 2607 (2006)(noting there is “no metric . . . for making the necessary distinctions”); Jacob Loshin & Aaron
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“major questions” case than some others, 90 the Chief Justice did little to delineate a set of clear
legal criteria that could resolve closer cases.
In cases such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson and NFIB v. Department of Labor, the
agencies sought to use long extant power in a new way that was likely unanticipated by the
Congress that enacted the statute, or Congresses since. Insofar as an agency’s delegated power
derives its democratic legitimacy from a deliberate legislative choice by the legislature to
authorize such power, finding new powers in old statutes is a problem.91 If an agency can go
decades before discovering broad authority within its authorizing legislation, that is “telling”
evidence that such power was not delegated.92
The age of the statute and the novelty of the agency’s asserted authority played a
significant role in the Chief Justice’s analysis. Citing Justice Frankfurter, the Chief Justice placed
substantial weight upon history and agency practice in the major questions analysis:
just as established practice may shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general
statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by those who presumably would be
alert to exercise it, is equally significant in determining whether such power was actually
conferred.93
This is a reasonable inference to draw. Yet as discussed below, it is not clear why this inference
should only be drawn in the context of “major questions.” If the question before the Court is

Nielson, Hiding Delegation in Mouseholes, 62 Admin. L. Rev. 19, 23 (2010) (“One judge’s mouse is another
judge’s elephant, and it ever will be so.”)
90

See Richardson, supra note __, at 388-89 (explaining why a challenge to the CPP would almost certainly be
considered a “major questions” case).

91

See generally Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931 (2020).

92

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2609.

93

FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 352 (1941).
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whether an agency is exercising delegated power, and agency practice and historical
understandings are probative of statutory meaning, this would seem to be true for major and
minor questions alike. Further, suggesting that once litigants are able to convince a court that a
given case presents a “major question” they can discard traditional methods of statutory
interpretation is not conducive to consistent and principled decision-making.
Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate concurrence, stressing his view that the major questions
doctrine is properly understood as a clear statement rule that prevents Congress from delegating
broad legislative power to agencies. There is much to this intuition, even if one does not ground
the major questions doctrine in a concern for excessive delegation, as Justice Gorsuch would
wish to do. It does not, however, solve the problem of identifying which cases are major and
which are not. If anything, it suggests that whether a case presents a “major question” should not
be a threshold inquiry.

A Step (Zero) Beyond Major Questions

Rather than focus on whether a given case presents a “major question” that would justify
loading the interpretive deck, the Court should have instead started at the beginning, what we
might call Delegation Step Zero.94
All legislative powers are vested in Congress. Whether or not such powers may be
delegated to the executive branch, there is no question where such powers begin. Put another

94

See Jonathan H. Adler, A ‘Step Zero’ for Delegations, in The Administrative State Before the Supreme Court:
Perspectives on the Nondelegation Doctrine (Peter Wallison & John Yoo eds., AEI Press 2022), from which this
portion of this article draws. For the origins of the “Step Zero” concept, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 873 (2001).
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way, the constitutional allocation of powers embodies a nondelegation baseline: Absent
legislative action, all legislative power is in the legislature’s hands, and none is in the hands of
any administrative agency or part of the executive branch. This is not a nondelegation doctrine,
so much as a delegation doctrine: A doctrine that recognizes that delegations are necessary for
agencies to have regulatory power.
As the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, “an agency literally has no power to act . . .
unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”95 This is (or should be) “axiomatic.”96 As the
Court further explained in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown:
The legislative power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of
quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a
grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body
imposes.97
This means that a delegation of power is necessary for administrative agencies to act. Without a
delegation, the agency has no regulatory power.
That Chief Justice Roberts reiterated this point in WV v. EPA,98 as he had in other
opinions. In his Arlington dissent, for instance, the Chief Justice noted that Chevron deference is
premised upon legislative delegation of interpretive authority to a federal agency.99 Without such

95

Louisiana Pub. Svc. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 US 355, 374 (1986).

96

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s
power to promulgate legislative regulation is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”)

97

441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).

98

WV 142 S.Ct. at 2609 (“Agencies have only those powers given to them by Congress”).

99

City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 317 (2013)(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). According to Tom Merrill, this
dissent “deserves to enter the annals as a classic statement of the principles of administrative law.” Thomas W.
Merrill, The Chevron Doctrine: Its Rise and Fall and the Future of the Administrative State 226 (2022).
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a delegation, no deference is due. And because it is for courts to resolve questions of law,
“whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to provide an interpretation that
carries the force of law is for the judge to answer independently.”100 Further, such delegations
are not dispersed wholesale. Rather, such authority is delegated with regard to “particular”
statutory provisions or purposes.101
As then-Judge Breyer noted in a 1985 lecture, “Congress is more likely to have focused
upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in
the courts of [a] statute’s daily administration.”102 While then-Judge Breyer was focused on the
question of Chevron deference, he was making a point about when it is reasonable to presume
that a delegation of authority has occurred absent a clear statement in the statutory text. As he put
it, this simply reflects “common sense as to the manner in which Congress [is] likely to delegate”
power to federal agencies.103
That language may be ambiguous, or may be creatively interpreted to justify a given
assertion of regulatory power is not enough to establish that a delegation has taken place. In
Chevron cases, courts recognize that statutory ambiguity is not enough to justify deference to an
agency’s interpretation. There must also be reason to believe that Congress delegated authority to
resolve the ambiguity to the agency. Thus, in King v. Burwell, the Court refused to grant
Chevron deference to the Internal Revenue Service even though it found the relevant statutory
language to be ambiguous (and ultimately agreed with the agency’s interpretation on the

100

Arlington, 569 U.S. at 317 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

101

Id. at 320.

102

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L. Rev., 363, 370 (1986).

103

WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2609 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133).
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merits).104 Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has recognized that “mere
ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.”105 Ambiguity is
necessary, but not sufficient.
There is no reason to confine this inquiry to Chevron cases. If the Chevron step zero
inquiry is necessary because courts must first determine whether Congress has delegated
interpretive authority before deferring to an agency, then a similar inquiry should be required
before a court upholds an agency’s assertion of regulatory authority. And, as with Chevron, such
authority must be demonstrated. As the Court held in Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., known as the Queen and Crescent Case,
in 1897, the power to issue rules mandating or prohibiting private conduct (in this case, rates for
rail transport) “is not to be presumed or implied from any doubtful and uncertain language.”106
The Supreme Court has not always adhered to this approach (which is why Chief Justice Roberts
found himself in dissent in Arlington), but it has never been repudiated.107
In place of a threshold inquiry into whether the economic or political stakes of a case are
sufficiently “major” or “extraordinary,” courts would be better off focusing on the root question

104

King, 576 U.S. at 485-486.

105

ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

106

See ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Tx. Pacific Rwy. Co., 167 US 497, 505 (1897). The case is referred to as
the “Queen and Crescent” case because the rail line went between the Queen City (Cincinnati) and the Crescent City
(New Orleans).
107

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has also recognized in numerous cases going back decades. See,
for example, Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Agency authority may not be lightly
presumed. ‘Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies
would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony.” (cleaned up)); American Bus Assn v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“Agencies have no inherent powers. They . . . are creatures of statute . . . [that] may
act only because, and only to the extent that, Congress affirmatively has delegated them the power to act.”); Railway
Labor Executives’ Assn v. Natl. Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir 1994) (“the Board would have us presume a
delegation of power from Congress absent an express withholding of such power.”).
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of whether Congress delegated the asserted authority to the agency, and whether the evidence of
such a delegation is commensurate with the nature of the authority asserted. In this way, the
major-ness of the question at issue would be less of a threshold to be crossed, than a continuum
to be incorporated into the statutory analysis. The weight of evidence necessary to support an
asserted delegation should be proportional to the breadth, scope, and novelty of the delegated
power claimed.
The specific inquiry contemplated here would consider several factors, all of which
center on whether a prior delegation authorizes the agency action in question. The delegation of
authority must be explicit in the plain language of the authorizing statute, as it would have been
understood at the time of enactment. It must be plausible that the delegation of power is
supported by the statute’s original public meaning. In addition, the agency must be able to
demonstrate that the problem it seeks to address is that which the legislature had in mind when
the authority was delegated—or was at least of the sort that the legislative enactment was
designed to address. That a contemporary reading of previously enacted statutory language
would seem to encompass a previously unknown problem would not be sufficient. Relatedly,
insofar as the authorizing legislation embodies an “intelligible principle,” this principle should be
understood as it would have been at the time of enactment. Accordingly, any such delegation
must be understood to address then-contemporary problems and not as an open-ended grant of
future authority to be deployed in unforeseen circumstances to address unanticipated problems. It
is also appropriate for the Court to ask whether the agency is claiming delegated authority in an
area within its expertise and the expertise it had at the time of the enactment.
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Ambiguous language and the passage of time should not present an opportunity for
agencies to bootstrap authority over previously unregulated concerns.108 Merely because a given
word (say, “system”), taken out of context, may seem to be a capacious vessel for a convenient
power is no reason to green-light a newfound regulatory power. There is good reason for courts
to be skeptical when agencies (or outside litigants) purport to identify previously undiscovered
and unused authority to address emergent mischief. Agency departures from past practice or
prior understandings of their own authority should be particularly suspect. Indeed, where an
agency seeks to enter into a new field or exercise long dormant powers, this should create a
presumption against the existence of a delegation.
Both for deciding the case at hand, and bequeathing a manageable doctrine to the lower
courts, the Court would have been better off engaging in a holistic statutory inquiry into the
nature of the agency power asserted, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
agency’s claim of delegated power, than to offer a one-off escape hatch dependent upon a
contested judgment about whether a given action is sufficiently “major” or “extraordinary.” The
latter course invites unprincipled and politically contingent inquiries outside of judges core
competencies, and invites the complaint that courts are making political judgments, rather than
legal ones.

Questions about EPA’s Remaining Authority

108
See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 US 638, 650 (1990)(“It is fundamental ‘that an agency may not bootstrap
itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction.’” (cleaned up)).
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WV v. EPA bars the EPA from adopting expansive regulations under Section 7411 that
would require existing power plants to engage in generation shifting. The decision does not bar
the EPA from continuing to regulate GHGs, however. The Court took no steps toward
overturning Mass v. EPA, and raised no questions about the legal viability of other GHG
regulations on the books. WV v. EPA does not even bar the regulation of GHGs under Section
7411. It simply bars the EPA from re-interpreting longstanding regulatory authority in new and
expansive ways, particularly insofar as such re-interpretation is intended to adopt regulatory
measures that the enacting Congress had not anticipated. In this sense, WV v. EPA is a clear
sequel to UARG v. EPA, which likewise reaffirmed the EPA’s traditional regulatory authority
while simultaneously invoking the major questions doctrine to reject the agency’s effort to
unilaterally update its authority so as to more effectively control GHGs.
While a Section 7411(d) rule requiring generation shifting is off the table, the EPA is
likely to adopt a new set of rules governing GHG emissions from coal-fired power plants. In late
June the EPA indicated that it had already begun working on a new rule, planned to
release a proposed rule in March 2023, and a final rule in 2024.109 These new rules will not
replicate the CPP, or anything like it, but the agency retains a range of options beyond a narrow
focus on heat-rate improvements and other plant-specific efficiency improvements. Possibilities
include basing BSER on co-firing, which would require power plants to incorporate greater use
of natural gas or other lower-carbon fuels.110 While the Trump Administration rejected co-firing
as an option in promulgating the ACE rule, co-firing is used at a substantial percentage of fossil-

109

Jean Chemnick, Biden Admin Postpones Power Plant Carbon Rules, ClimateWire, June 22, 2022.

110
See Maya Domeshek & Dallas Burtraw, Reducing Coal Plant Emissions by Cofiring with Natural Gas,
Resources for the Future Issue Brief 21-04, May 2021, https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF_IB_21-04.pdf.
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fuel-fired power plants.111 Thus the EPA could argue that it has been adequately demonstrated as
a system of emission reduction that can be adopted at individual stationary sources. Another
possibility would be to identify carbon, capture and sequestration as the BSER, though this might
be challenged as either not adequately demonstrated or too costly.
While the EPA’s options are much narrower than they would have been under the D.C.
Circuit’s interpretation of Section 7411, the agency retains some residual flexibility to draft a
new Section 7411(d) rule governing GHG emissions from power plants, and should not preclude
states from authorizing cap-and-trade or generation shifting as a means of complying with a
more traditional standards of performance. Indeed, the Chief Justice seemed to go out of his way
to make clear that the Court was not embracing the rigid interpretation of Section 7411 the
Trump Administration had adopted, noting the Court had “no occasion to decide whether the
statutory phrase "system of emission reduction” refers exclusively to measures that improve the
pollution performance of individual sources, such that all other actions are ineligible to qualify as
the BSER.”112 The only question the Court decided was “whether the ‘best system of emission
reduction‘ identified by EPA in the Clean Power Plan was within the authority granted to the
Agency in Section 7411(d) of the CAA.”113
As noted, WV v. EPA does nothing to curtail the EPA’s use of other existing authorities to
regulate GHG emissions directly, such as has been done with vehicular emissions in the wake of
Massachusetts v. EPA and major sources already subject to regulation under Section 165. WV v.

111

Id. at 1.
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WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2615-16.
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Id.
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EPA may, however, make it more difficult for the EPA to deploy other CAA provisions against
GHGs.
The CAA provisions establishing and enforcing National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for criteria air pollutants are the “heart” of the Act.114 Ever since Mass v. EPA, environmentalist
organizations have urged the EPA to utilize these provisions more aggressively to mitigate
climate change. Some have even proposed listing GHGs as criteria air pollutants for purposes of
the NAAQS provisions.115 Give that the NAAQS provisions were written and structured to
ensure that each portion of the country achieves a set national standard for ambient air quality,
and not to control emission levels generally or stabilize atmospheric concentrations of a globally
dispersed pollutant, any such effort would be likely to fail in the wake of WV v. EPA.
GHGs need not be listed as criteria air pollutants for the NAAQS provisions to be useful
in reducing GHG emissions, however. Tightening the national ambient air quality standard for
particulate matter, for example, would not only reduce soot and fine particles in the air. It would
also put the squeeze on many large sources of GHGs, coal-burning facilities in particular,
reducing GHGs emissions as a co-benefit. This would appear to be a viable strategy, so long as
the EPA does not lead courts to believe that such regulatory measures are adopted for the
purpose of GHG control.

114

See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (characterizing NAAQS provisions as “heart” of the
CAA).
115

See, e.g,, See Center for Biological Diversity, Petition to Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse
Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (Dec. 2, 2009).The EPA denied this petition in January 2021, but then
subsequently withdrew reversed the denial in March 2021 “as the agency did not fully and fairly assess the issues
raised by the petition.” See Letter from Acting Administrator Jane Nishida, Mar. 4, 2021,
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/21-03-05-Decision-WithdrawingDenial.pdf.
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WV v. EPA and the COVID cases highlight the Court’s concern that the executive branch
sometimes seeks to expand and repurpose existing statutory authority to address broader (and
perhaps worthwhile) policy goals beyond those with which Congress was focused when the
statute was enacted. There is no problem if an agency action that addresses A (particulates)
necessarily addresses B (GHGs) at the same time. In such cases, B is a co-benefit of addressing
A. If, however, the agency decides to address A for the purpose of B—and Congress has not
authorized B—this raises the prospect of what we might call “regulatory pretext.”
Concern for pretext is common in administrative law, but the rule against is rarely
enforced with much vigor. Provided that an agency can offer a reasoned explanation of its
actions and justify the choices it made in terms aligned with its statutory authority, that is usually
good enough to survive judicial review. In the Census case, however, Chief Roberts suggested
courts should look more closely when there is reason to suspect an agency's explanation is
"contrived."116 What judicial review requires, Roberts explained, is that agencies provide
"genuine justifications for important decisions," and not "distractions" or subterfuge.117
Whereas pretext analysis is often used to ferret truly nefarious motives, such as racial or
religious discrimination, the Roberts Court is suspicious of agency attempts to use regulatory
authority delegated for one purpose to address another. So, for example, it appears the Court’s
majority in NFIB was concerned that the Biden Administration was trying to use OSHA’s
authority to set workplace safety standards as a means of increasing vaccination more

116

Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2575-2576 (2019).

117

Id. at 2556.
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generally.118 Lacking any clear statutory authority to impose a nationwide COVID-19
vaccination requirement, the Biden Administration sought to use the OSHA rule as part of (what
the President described as) "a new plan to require more Americans to be vaccinated.”119
Likewise, in WV, the Court’s majority showed some concern that the Biden Administration was
seeking to use provisions authorizing the imposition of source-specific pollution control
standards as a way to “drive a[n] . . . aggressive transformation in the domestic energy
industry.”120 Thus, were the EPA to tighten the particulate NAAQS standards for the stated
purpose of reducing coal consumption and thereby reducing GHG emissions, this might raise a
red flag.
More broadly, WV v. EPA suggests that efforts to encourage a “all-of-government”
approach to climate change through executive order and presidential directive are likely to face
stiff headwinds in court.121 Congress retains the authority to direct any and all federal agencies to
do more to mitigate the threat of climate change, but unless and until it does so, the authority of
individual administrative agencies to pursue climate goals is limited, particularly where it
involves taking pre-existing authorities and redirecting them toward climate change
One regulatory proposal sure to get additional scrutiny in the wake of WV v. EPA is the
Security and Exchange Commission's proposal to "enhance and standardize climate-related
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See Michael C. Dorf, Pretext Explains (But Does Not Justify) the SCOTUS Invalidation of the OSHA Vaccine
Rule, Dorf on Law, Jan. 17, 2022, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2022/01/pretext-explains-but-does-not-justify.html.
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See NFIB v. Dep’t. of Labor, 142 S.Ct. 661, 663 (2022).
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WV, 142 S.Ct. at 2604 (quoting White House Fact Sheet on Clean Power Plan).
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The Office of Domestic Climate Policy in the Biden Administration “implements the President’s domestic
climate agenda, coordinating the all-of-government approach to tackle the climate crisis, create good-paying, union
jobs, and advance environmental justice.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/odcp/.
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disclosures for investors."122 Insofar as such disclosure requirements represent an extension of
SEC authority beyond its core mission of protecting investors and force it to address matters
outside of its traditional areas of expertise, it would seem to implicate the major questions
doctrine and be vulnerable to challenge under WV v. EPA.123 To defend its rule, the SEC will
likely argue that climate disclosures merely represent an update of traditional disclosure
requirements in light of recent developments. Efforts by other regulatory agencies, including the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to focus their preexisting regulatory authority on
climate change would also seem potentially vulnerable as implicating major questions as well.
The implications of WV v. EPA extend beyond environmental policy, however. As the
Chief Justice noted, such questions of extraordinary importance may arise from any corner of the
administrative state, and the opinion makes clear that courts are to be suspicious when agencies
engage in self-aggrandizing behavior or otherwise seek to pour new wine from old bottles.
Wherever an agency opts to update, redirect, or repurpose its authority in light of technological
or other changes, there is a risk the major questions doctrine could be implicated. Agencies such
as the Federal Communications Commission and Federal Trade Commission are on notice too.

Conclusion
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See Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg. 21334 (Apr.
11, 2022).
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See Paul Atkins and Paul Ray, The SEC’s Climate Rule Won’t Hold Up in Court, Wall. St. J., July 12, 2022,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-climate-rule-wont-hold-up-in-court-west-virginia-epa-agency-congress11657659630.
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When the Supreme Court concludes that an agency action exceeds the scope of the
agency’s delegated authority, it is an invitation to Congress to consider whether the agency
should have such authority. After the Court rejected the FCC’s claimed authority to relieve longdistance carriers of tariff filing obligations in MCI v. AT&T,124 Congress enacted the 1996
reforms to the Communications Act, providing the FCC with the authority to relieve regulatory
burdens so as to enhance competition in telecommunications services.125 Similarly, after the
Court rejected the FDA’s claimed authority to regulate tobacco as a “drug” under the FDCA,126
Congress soon enacted a new tobacco-control statute providing the FDA with new authority to
regulate tobacco products, tailored to the particulars of the tobacco industry.127 In both cases, the
new authorities delegated by Congress were different from the authority the agency’s had sought
to exercise.
The Supreme Court’s decision in WV v. EPA need not be the last word on whether
generation shifting should play a role in mitigating the threat of climate change. There is broad
consensus that more flexible, outcome-based strategies are more cost effective and efficient than
facility-by-facility permitting. If legislative majorities support federal regulation of the power
sector to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Congress can still take that step. What Congress
cannot do is sit back and hope that agencies discover how to unearth broad regulatory powers in
the deepest regions of statutes it passed decades ago.
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512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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Telecommunications Act of 1996, , Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Family Smoking Prevenetion & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).

